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h i g h l i g h t s
• We use a probabilistic consumer choice framework to model firm competition in a market.
• Firms are allowed to compete by both quality and price of their products.
• We find Nash market equilibria in various situations.
• Contrary to classical Bertrand competition, marginal firm profits do not always vanish.
• Small firms are able to improve their profit by engaging in competition.
We develop a probabilistic consumer choice framework based on information asymmetry
between consumers and firms. This framework makes it possible to study market compe-
tition of several firms by both quality and price of their products. We find Nash market
equilibria and other optimal strategies in various situations ranging from competition of
two identical firms to firms of different sizes and firms which improve their efficiency.
1. Introduction
Firm competition, one of themost basicmarket processes, has been famously discussed by Adam Smith [1]. Two pioneer-
ingmodels by Cournot and Bertrand [2, Chapter 27] then described firm competition by quantity and price, respectively, and
provided the first explanations of market behavior in their respective cases. In the Bertrand model, consumers give abso-
lute preference to the lowest price which consequently drives firm profits to zero. By contrast, the Cournot model assumes
that the offered products are homogeneous (indistinguishable), derives the price from the aggregate quantity produced by
all firms, and allows non-zero profits to be made. While it may seem obvious that Bertrand competition is more beneficial
for the consumers than Cournot competition, this is not always the case [3]. Firm competition models were later improved
by modeling the consumer choice through a utility function which is maximized by each individual consumer and whose
maximum then reflects the market’s behavior. An example of this approach is provided by the classical Dixit–Stiglitz model
of monopolistic competition [4] and an extensive line of work that it has inspired [5].
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It soon became clear that a certain degree of price dispersion is present in real markets [6,7] and thus models building
on the assumption of a unique price are insufficient. A market where both informed and uninformed customers are present
was shown to lead to ‘‘spatial’’ price dispersion where some stores sell at a competitive price and others sell at a higher
price [8]. The phenomenon of ‘‘temporal’’ price dispersion where each store varies its price over time (and thus prevents
the customers from learning and distinguishing ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ shops) has been modeled in Ref. [9]. See Ref. [10] for
an exhaustive review of work on price dispersion. However, even these models based on the economics of information [6]
and the search of consumers for information in a market [11] are not entirely satisfactory because they assume that upon
inspection, a consumer is able to exactly determine the utility of a given product.
We build on a market model where each product is endowed with intrinsic quality and each consumer with quality
assessment ability (in general, both quality and ability are continuously distributed over a certain range) [12,13]. The demand
is generated by consumers, not imposed by firms. This model was shown to produce product differentiation where high-
quality products target experienced consumers and low-quality products target the unexperienced (or negligent) ones [14].
While [14] deals with the case of heterogeneous consumers served by a monopolist firm, we now focus on homogeneous
consumers served by multiple firms. By assuming that each consumer has a maximal price which they are willing to pay,
we generalize this framework to include also product price in the consumer decision process. This allows us to model firm
competition by product quality and price. With respect to other works where, typically, two consumer groups and two
different product levels distinguished by quality or price are considered [15], the current framework makes it possible to
explicitly study the impact of consumer ability on the market equilibrium. It contributes to an extensive line of complex
systems research which has helped to understand basic features of various systems in economics [16,17], sociology [18],
and network science [19].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the framework and find the optimal strategy of a
monopolist firm. In Section 3, we study the basic case of two homogeneous firms competing in the market, characterize the
market (Nash) equilibrium upon various strategies adopted by these firms, and show that firms can outperform the Nash
equilibrium. In Section 4, we study three simple generalizations of the basic case: competition of several firms, competition
of firms of different size, and the effect of unequal firm efficiency on the market. In Section 5, we summarize the work and
discuss the most important open questions and further research directions.
2. Basic framework
We present here a probabilistic framework for consumer choice and firm profit which deviates from the framework
studied in Ref. [14] by considering price sensitivity of consumers. The two basic characteristics of any product offered by a
firm are its intrinsic quality Q and its price p. The probabilistic behavior of the consumers is due to information asymmetry
between them and firms which results in consumers being unable to assess quality of products with certainty. The three
main assumptions of our framework are as follows:
1. The firm’s profit fromeach sold unit is assumed in the form p−Q . Here p represents the firm’s income fromselling the item
and −Q represents the cost necessary to produce a product of quality Q . The use of a different quality–cost relationship
does not significantly alter the framework’s behavior as long as the basic condition of monotonicity (production cost
grows with the product’s quality) holds.
2. When offered a product of quality Q and price p, the probability that a given consumer accepts the offer and purchases
the product – a so-called ‘‘acceptance’’ probability – is
PA(Q , p) = (1 − p/pm)(Q/p)α. (1)
Here the first term reflects that there is a maximal price pm that the consumer can afford and the acceptance probability
vanishes as p approaches to pm. The second term reflects the consumer’s evaluation of the product quality relative to
the product price whereas α is a parameter characterizing how experienced is the consumer. Experienced consumers
are able to assess the intrinsic product’s quality and their acceptance probability is therefore substantial only when Q
is close to p (they require value for their money) which corresponds to α being large. Little experienced consumers are
characterized by lowα and they are likely to accept also a productwith badQ/p ratio. Plots visualizing the behavior of the
acceptance probability given by Eq. (1) are shown in Fig. 1. Note that Appendix presents a more fundamental derivation
of the acceptance probability. Similarly, the value of pm can vary between the consumers and thus reflect their diverse
budget constraints. To limit the scope of our presentwork, we leave the case of heterogeneous pm values and their impact
on market equilibria for future study.
3. We assume that a consumer facingmultiple offers first selects one of themand then decideswhether to purchase it or not.
It is natural to require that the probability to select a given product – a so-called ‘‘selection’’ probability – grows with the
product’s quality and decreases with the product’s price. Since the acceptance probability PA(Q , p) = (1− p/pm)(Q/p)α
has exactly these properties, we assume for simplicity that the probability of selecting a particular product is also
proportional to (1 − p/pm)(Q/p)α . The separation of consumer decision into a selection step and an acceptance step
implies that even when several distinct products are available, at most one of them will be purchased by a given
consumer.
2
ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
a b
Fig. 1. Illustrations of the acceptance probability PA(Q , p) for various values of α: (a) Fixed p = 1 and pm = 2 (Q where profit can be made thus runs from
0 to 1), (b) Fixed Q = 1 and pm = 2 (pwhere profit can be made thus runs from 1 to 2).
While different functional forms can be chosen in each of these three points, our choice represents a simple and yet plausible
way to model consumer behavior in a market. Note that we omit a potential α-dependent multiplying factor in PA(Q , p)
which was previously used in Refs. [13,14] to reflect the fact that consumers with low α may reject even a perfect (i.e.,
Q = p) offer. Since we study a homogeneous population of consumers here, this omission has no effect on the found
market equilibria. We stress again that the use of consumer acceptance probability implies that demand is generated by
consumers, not imposed by firms. On the other hand, quality and price are dictated by firms. This means that out of two
classical competitionmodels, that of Cournot and Bertrand [2, Chapter 27], our framework is closer to Bertrand competition.
When there is only one firm in the market that offers a product of quality Q and price p, rule 3 has no importance and
the firm’s profit is determined only by the acceptance probability and the profit per sold unit. Firm profit per consumer is
therefore X(Q , p) = (p−Q )PA(Q , p)where PA(Q , p) needs to be in general averaged over all consumers and their respective
parameters α and pm. Assuming that all consumers are identical, we readily obtain
X(Q , p) = (1 − p/pm)(Q/p)α(p − Q ). (2)
When p > pm, this profit is zero because no consumer accepts the offer. When Q > p, the firm loses money with each sold
item. We thus consider p < pm and Q < p as constraints for profit optimization. Note that Eq. (2) is a slight generalization
of the profit function in Ref. [14, Section 4] where it was implicitly assumed that pm = α + 1 (i.e., experienced consumers
are willing to pay high price). The current form with two parameters, α and pm, makes it possible to model a broader range
of consumer behavior than the previous one.
Firms strive to optimize their profit. In the case of one monopolistic firm facing consumers with quality-recognizing
ability α and maximal price pm, profit-maximizing product parameters and the maximal profit per consumer are
Q ∗1 =
αpm
2(α + 1) , p
∗
1 =
pm
2
, X∗1 =
pm
4α
(
α
α + 1
)α
. (3)
Subscripts denote that these results apply to the case with one firm. One can see that these results are proportional to
pm; this parameter thus not only determines the economically profitable range for p and Q but also the optimal price and
quality levels. The same optimal price, quality, and total profit are achieved by several firms acting in themarket in collusion.
Constrained profit optimization where, for some reason, either quality or price are fixed can be studied as well but we do
not report their detailed results here.
2.1. Two firms or more
When there are two firms in the market, each offering their own products with quality values Q1,Q2 and price levels
p1, p2, we use the above-described two-step consumer decision process which was first proposed in Ref. [14]. The process
consists of two steps: a consumer first selects which product they prefer most (the selection step) and then decides whether
to actually buy it or not (the acceptance step). Similarly as the second step is described by the acceptance probability
PA(Qi, pi), the first step is described by a so-called selection probability PS(Qi, pi|Q1,Q2, p1, p2) of selecting the product of
firm i. As explained before, we assume for simplicity that the selection probability is proportional to (1 − pi/pm)(Qi/pi)α .
The proportionality constant is given by normalization of this probability (i.e., exactly one product must be selected by each
consumer). This approach to the description of the demand of individual consumers facing discrete choices has been used
extensively in the past [20,21].
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The above-described example is easily generalizable to the case of N firms. Denoting the quality and price values of the
offered products as (Q1, . . . ,QN) := Q and (p1, . . . , pN) := p, respectively, the selection probability becomes
PS(Qi, pi|Q , p) = (1 − pi/pm)(Qi/pi)
α
N∑
j=1
(1 − pj/pm)(Qj/pj)α
. (4)
In summary, the per-consumer profit of firm iwhich offers a product with quality Qi and price pi reads
X(Qi, pi|Q , p) = PS(Qi, pi|Q , p)PA(Qi, pi)(pi − Qi) (5)
where the selection step, the acceptance step, and the marginal profit from each sold item are combined together. As we
shall see in the following section, the introduction of several firms in the market creates a rich systemwhere various game-
theoretic concepts apply.
3. Competition of two homogeneous firms
Wenowproceed to study the behavior of ourmarketmodel in the presence of two homogeneous firms (i.e., firms sharing
all important characteristics such as size and production costs). Tomaximize their profit, both firms attempt to adjust quality
and price of their products in such a way that their own profit is maximized. The situation where both quality and price are
the same as in the case of amonopolist firm is therefore inherently unstable: each firm can increase the profit by unilaterally
altering quality and price of its product. This would be naturally followed by an analogous move on the competitor’s side.
The sequence of mutually-provoked adjustments would eventually settle in a configuration where neither side can improve
its profit by a unilateral move which is of course the classical Nash equilibrium [22]. The combined profit of the firms is
expected to decrease by competition with respect to the monopolist (or non-competitive) case.
Since there is no reason why quality and price values should differ between the two firms, the Nash equilibrium values
QN2 and p
N
2 must be the same for both firms. These values can be found by requiring that an infinitesimal change by one firm
leaves the firm’s profit unchanged
X(QN2 + dQ , pN2 + dp|QN2 , pN2 ) = X(QN2 , pN2 |QN2 , pN2 )
which must hold up the first order in dQ and dp. This is naturally equivalent to ∂Q X(Q , p) = ∂pX(Q , p) = 0 at (QN2 , pN2 ).
Using Eq. (5), the market equilibrium can be readily found in the form
QN2 =
6αpm
5(2 + 3α) , p
N
2 =
2
5
pm (6)
where subscripts denote that the results relate to the case of two competing firms and the superscripts denote that the
results represent the Nash equilibrium. It is interesting to note that while product price is always lowered by competition,
product quality can go either way. The quality ratio
2(α) := Q
N
2
Q ∗1
= 12(1 + α)
5(2 + 3α) ,
which is plotted in Fig. 2(a), is greater than one only for α < 23 . Similarly, one can compare the resulting profit of each firm
with X∗1 /2 which is achieved when the two firms do not compete and keep quality and price at the levels corresponding to
those of amonopolist firm. The ratio of profit with andwithout competition, a so-called profit ratio, is for us the key quantity
to evaluate the effect of competition on the system. In the given case of two firms competing by both quality and price, it
reads
ξ2(α) := X
N
2
X∗1 /2
= 16
25
(
3 + 3α
2 + 3α
)1+α
.
As shown in Fig. 2(b), the profit ratio decreasesmonotonically with α and approaches 16 3
√
e/25 ≈ 0.89 in the limit α → ∞.
When comparing Q ∗1 with Q
N
2 , there is an apparent paradox because quality is improved by competition for unexperi-
enced consumers and worsened for experienced consumers. This is due to the initial optimal setting Q ∗1 = αpm/[2(1+ α)]
which is, when α is high, close to the optimal price p∗1 = pm/2 and thus the marginal profit p∗1 − Q ∗1 is small. Price decrease
due to competition, if not compensated by a quality decrease, would therefore lead to a negative marginal profit. The op-
timal firm response to competition is thus to decrease both price and quality. By contrast, when α is small, the difference
between Q ∗1 and p
∗
1 is large which makes quality improvement due to competition possible.
It is instructive to study a particular situation where there are two firms in a market and firm 1 decides to decrease price
of its product in order to maximize its profit (product quality is fixed either for production reasons or because of the firm’s
decision). Firm 2 then has four different response strategies: do nothing, adjust price, adjust quality, and finally adjust both
price and quality. We focus again on the Nash equilibrium where neither of the firms can improve its profit. The resulting
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Fig. 2. A comparison of firm competition outcomes with the one firm case. (a) Quality ratio n(α) := QNn /Q ∗1 lying both above and below one shows
that depending on α and n, competition can lead to both increased and decreased quality of products. (b) Profit ratio ξn(α) := XNn /(X∗1 /n) monotonically
decreases with both α and n. (c) Marginal profit pNn − QNn vanishes when α → ∞ for n fixed but does not vanish when n → ∞ for α fixed.
Fig. 3. The optimal profit ratio ξ of firm 2 as a function of α under four distinct competition strategies.
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Fig. 4. The profit ratio as a function of the farsighted firm’s strategy for both firms and various competition scenarios; α = 2. The horizontal dashed line
denotes the Nash profit ratio. While the farsighted firm can improve over the Nash-equilibrium solution over a wide range of τ (solid line), the optimizing
firm benefits more (dash-dotted line).
profit ratio of firm 2 is shown in Fig. 3 as a function of α (the analytical results are too complicated to be shown here). As
expected, the first response (do nothing) is the worst one and the last one (adjust both Q and p) is the best one. One can
note that in the current setting, price competition is more effective than quality competition for all values of α. This is a
general statement which holds also when it is assumed that firm 1 has decided to compete by improving product quality
or by adjusting both quality and price. The reason lies in the profit formula Eq. (2) which implies that customers are always
price-sensitive but their quality sensitivity vanishes as α → 0. This is also the reason why for α  1, results achieved by
firm 2 with price adjustment are almost as good as those achieved with quality and price adjustment.
3.1. Beyond the Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium is a natural competition outcome for two firms focusing solely on maximizing each own’s profit
given the other firm’s strategy. However, the present framework is richer than that. We now consider the case of two firms:
while the sole goal of firm 1 is profit optimization, firm 2 is farsighted and does not always try to improve at the expense of
its competitor. Themotivation for this ‘‘lack’’ of competition is that firm 2 knows that evenwhen its profit could be improved
by a particular change of strategy, the realization of this change would provoke a strategy adjustment by firm 1 and both
firms would eventually end with less profit than before. To model this mechanism, we assume that the farsighted firm 2
chooses the quality and price of its product and keeps it fixed regardless of what does the optimizing firm 1. We consider a
simple one-dimensional parametrization
Q2(τ ) = Q ∗1 + τ(QN2 − Q ∗1 ), p2(τ ) = p∗1 + τ(pN2 − p∗1) (7)
which allows firm 2 to continuously adjust between the optimal monopolist behavior (when τ = 0) and the Nash equilib-
rium of two firms (when τ = 1). The strategy (Q1, p1) of firm 1 is chosen as an optimal response to the strategy of firm 2.
Profit of both firms is given by Eq. (5).
As shown in Fig. 4, labeling firm 2 as farsighted is indeed appropriate because this firm can outperform the Nash
equilibrium profit over a wide range of τ values. The optimal outcome is achieved by τ = 0.92 which is significantly
different from τ = 1 corresponding to the classical Nash equilibrium. The disadvantage of the farsighted approach is that
it brings far more benefit to the competing firm 1 which is able to take advantage of the lack of competition on the side of
firm2. Finally, the figure shows also the outcome of the farsighted firm confrontedwith a firm adopting theNash equilibrium
position. As expected, the farsighted approach yields no extra profit in this case and ξ(τ ) has a unique maximum at τ = 1.
This demonstrates that the improved profit of the farsighted firm can be realized by lowering the level of competition in the
market. When at least one firm competes fiercely by adopting the Nash equilibrium position regardless of the other market
participants’ actions, no profit improvement is possible. The example of a farsighted firm illustrates that firm strategies other
than profit maximization, which are very natural to study in the present framework, should not be neglected.
4. Generalizations
Without attempting to be exhaustive, we now discuss three illustrative cases which contribute to the understanding of
how customer ability and firm competition affect the market equilibria. Many other modifications and generalizations are
possible, some of which are mentioned in conclusions.
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4.1. Competition of several homogeneous firms
The treatment presented in Section 3 can be easily repeated for n competing firms, one of whichmay attempt to increase
its profit by adjusting quality and price of its product. The situation when no profit increase is possible defines the Nash
equilibrium with the corresponding quality and price levels
QNn =
αn(2n − 1)pm
(3n − 1)(n + α(2n − 1)) , p
N
n =
n
3n − 1 pm. (8)
When n → ∞, the equilibrium quality approaches 2αpm3(2α+1) . The ratio of QNn and Q ∗1 is
n(α) := Q
N
n
Q ∗1
= 2n(2n − 1)(1 + α)
(3n − 1)(n + α(2n − 1))
which is greater than one only for α < n2n−1 (one can see that as the number of competing firms increases, this threshold
decreases to the limit value of 1/2).
The profit ratio ξn(α) := XNn /(X∗1 /n) reads
ξn(α) = 4n
2
(3n − 1)2
(
(1 + α)(2n − 1)
n + α(2n − 1)
)α+1
. (9)
It again decreases with α with the limiting value
lim
α→∞ ξn(α) = 4n
2 exp[(n − 1)/(2n − 1)]/(3n − 1)2.
As n increases, this itself has a limiting value 4
√
e/9 ≈ 0.73 which tells us how much at most the total profit decreases by
competition (this largest decrease is observed for experienced consumers and many competing firms). We stress that ξn is
a relative change of profit which already takes the indirect reciprocity with respect to the number of firms into account. The
absolute profit of each firm naturally goes to zero as the number of firms increases: because of competition driving prices
down and quality up, but mainly because of splitting the total pie among more participants. To conclude, we show there
also the marginal profit pNn − QNn which quantifies firm profit per sold item and further shows that while competition does
not drivemarginal profit to zero, increasing consumer ability does. Lines representing results for n = 3, 5, 10,∞ are shown
in Fig. 2 along with the previously found results for two competing firms.
4.2. Firms of different sizes
Eq. (5) implicitly treats both firms as equal—based on quality and price of their products, they both enter in the selection
probability and consequently also in the profit equation in exactly the same way. We now generalize this framework by
accounting for the casewhere the visibility of firms differ because of, for example, their different size or different advertising
expenditures. Since the two usually go hand in hand (big companies havemore resources for advertising), we refer here to a
difference in firm size. While there are multiple ways of introducing firm size in the system, we study only the simplest one
where firm sizes are exogenous variables which are independent of current firm turnovers and profits (see the concluding
section for a further discussion of this issue). If the relative size of firms 1 and 2 are λ and λ′ = 1 − λ, respectively, we
generalize the probability of a consumer choosing firm 1 over firm 2 to the form
P1(Q1, p1|Q2, p2) = λ(1 − p1/pm)(Q1/p1)
α
λ(1 − p1/pm)(Q1/p1)α + λ′(1 − p2/pm)(Q2/p2)α . (10)
The probability of considering the product of firm 2 is complementary, P2(Q2, p2|Q1, p1) = 1 − P1(Q1, p1|Q2, p2).
It is straightforward to repeat the previous analysis and study the Nash market equilibrium in this case. As shown in
Fig. 5(a), the small firm can improve its profit by competing with the big one (i.e., by adjusting the quality and price of its
product). The limit value of λ below which firm 1 can improve its profit by competition varies little with α. In the case of
competition by both quality and price, for example, this threshold decreases from 0.30 for α = 0 to 0.279 for α = 2 and
0.275 for α = 4. Note that while firm 1 can improve its profit only until certain firm size λ, the relative decrease of its profit
due to competition is always smaller than that of the big firm 2 (due to its greater size, the absolute loss of profit of firm 2
is further magnified with respect to the absolute loss of profit of firm 1). The small firm thus always has the possibility to
hurt the big firm by competition more than it does hurt itself. Factors not included in our analysis, such as the volume of
firm reserve funds and possible long-term strategic considerations, determine whether firm 1 is ultimately interested in
this kind of rivalry or not.
The limit case of a negligibly small firm (λ → 0) is easy to be treated analytically and leads to the optimal strategy
p∗s =
pm
3
, Q ∗s =
(β − 1)pm
3β
, ξ ∗s =
16
27
(
β + 1
β
)β
(11)
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Fig. 5. Firms of different sizes: (a) The optimal profit ratio vs. λ for both small (S) and big (B) firm; α = 2. (b) The optimal profit ratio of the small firm vs.
α in the limit λ → 0. In both cases, outcomes of various competition strategies are shown.
Fig. 6. The impact of efficiency improvements on firm profit. Firms 1 (improving) and 2 (non-improving) are shown with thick blue and thin red lines,
respectively, for three different values of α. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.)
where β = 2α + 1. Since firm 1 is assumed to be negligibly small here, the optimal strategy of firm 2 is that of a monopolist
firm. As shown in Fig. 5(b), the profit ratio of the small firm, ξ ∗s , is substantially greater than one for any β ≥ 1 (α ≥ 0).
Inspecting the small firm’s optimal strategy given in Eq. (10)more closely, we find that it is based on a considerable price cut
and a corresponding quality adjustmentwhich is positive forβ < 2 (corresponding toα < 1/2) and negative forβ > 2 (this
is the same behavior as we have seen before forQNn whichwas also greater thanQ
∗
1 only for small α). One can similarly study
the situation where one small firm enters a market with two firms in the Nash equilibrium—the small firm again achieves
higher profit by competing than by ‘‘friendly’’ adopting the quality and price level set by its greater rivals. The relative profit
improvement of the small firm is then smaller than the values reported in Fig. 5. This reduced possible profit is given by QN2
and pN2 leaving less space for the benefit of a third firm than Q
∗
1 and p
∗
1 leave for a second firm.
4.3. The effect of unequal efficiency
Up to now, we always assumed that the marginal profit of each firm is p − Q . We now generalize it to the form
p − ηQ where η is a firm-specific parameter which gives us the possibility to model the effect of unequal firm efficiency
on the market. In particular, we assume η = 1 to be the default (starting) value which however can be lowered by, for
example, optimization of productions processes or by innovations. All other things being equal, smaller η implies smaller
production cost ηQ and thus higher marginal profit p − ηQ . One can note that while the upper bound on product price
remains to be pm, the upper bound on product quality becomes pm/η which grows as η decreases. The impact of increased
efficiency is therefore two-fold: reduction of the production cost and increase of themaximal economically profitable quality
of products.
We study the effect of efficiency on the market on a particular case of two competing firms which are initially
homogeneous as they both have η = 1. When firm 1 makes progress and achieves η1 < 1, the market equilibrium ceases
to be symmetric (in general, the optimal quality of firm 1 is higher than that of firm 2). As can be seen in Fig. 6, the impact
on firm profit is particularly strong when α is high. This is because a market with experienced consumers are characteristic
by a small marginal profit p∗ − Q ∗. Changing the marginal profit to p∗ − ηQ ∗ thus results in its substantial relative increase
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which is in turn followed by an update of the optimal strategy by both firms. The asymmetry between profit changes of the
two firms (firm 1 gaining more than firm 2 looses) is not surprising as it reflects an increase of the aggregate profit which is
an expected effect of efficiency improvements.
5. Conclusions
We have generalized our previously-introduced probabilistic framework for consumer choice based on quality
assessment [14] in order to include price sensitivity of consumers and used it to model firm competition in a market.
Thanks to this generalization, we have been able to study three different types of competition (by quality, by price, and
by both quality and price) and their impact on the market. When several firms compete in a market, it is natural to study
the resulting Nash equilibriumwhere no firm can increase its profit by adjusting properties (quality or price) of its product.
Within our framework, product price in the Nash equilibrium is always decreased by competition but product quality can go
either way: it increases when consumer ability is low and decreases when consumer ability is high. In addition to the Nash
equilibrium, we find that if one firm employs a less aggressive strategy, it can outperform the Nash-optimal profit which is
based on the assumption of strict profit maximization by all market participants.
While profit of each individual firm naturally goes to zero as the number of firms grows, their total profit does not vanish
due to competition regardless of consumers’ ability. Vanishingmarginal profits, a classical result of Bertrand competition, are
recovered only in the limit of infinitely experienced consumers (α → ∞). This kind of competition is a natural consequence
of each firm’s attempt to improve its own position which, however, ultimately leads to each firm earning less (similarly as
the classical prisoner’s dilemma leads to inferior outcome for both prisoners [23]).We find the situation to be differentwhen
the competing firms are of a different size. A small firm may even improve its profit by entering in competition with a big
firm: the big firm facing a small competitor adjusts the quality and price of its product less than the small firm does which
makes a profit increasing-solution possible for the small firm.
The present framework is very elementary, yet it allows for generalizations reflecting various aspects of firm competition
in an economy. For example, if multiple firms and multiple groups of consumers with distinct properties are present (as
studied in Ref. [14]), is it better for each firm to produce one product or is it Nash-stable that each firm produces multiple
products—one per each consumer group? There are also research questions that require more substantial modifications of
the present framework. The present static framework where firms coexist and their sizes (represented by λ and λ′ in Eq.
(10)) are fixed. Assuming that the current firm’s profit (or turnover) influences the firm’s size, the system suddenly gains a
temporal dimension and allows one to study effects such as dynamic equilibria, the growth and decay of firms, and the effect
of efficiency improvements and innovations in such a dynamical setting. Including the economies of scale has the potential
to make the range of produced phenomena even richer. Further insights on which model modifications are indeed crucial
and which are not, as well as evidence in support of the basic model, can be gained by attempts to calibrate the present
market models on real economic data.
We have simplified the consumer decision process by assuming that each consumer is characterized by one single
parameter – quality assessment ability α – which then applies to any available product. In reality, however, consumer
attention and other resources required for the choice of products are often limited. This limitation is particularly relevant in
the nowadays societywhere there is amultitude of products to choose fromRef. [24]. This can be reflected by endowing each
consumer with a limited amount of resources which can be then divided among the available products and spent on their
assessment. It is then natural to study questions such as the optimal division of resources and, consequently, the impact of
limited consumer attention on the outcome of firm competition in a market.
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Appendix. On the origin of the acceptance probability
While it is possible to interpret our consumer decision framework as a purely phenomenological model, we now lay
out microscopic foundations for the acceptance probability PA(Q , p) which is central to the whole framework. We assume
that an available product is characterized by its intrinsic quality Q and price p. A consumer who evaluates this product is
characterized by standard deviation σ of perceived product quality Q ′ which, for the sake of simplicity, is assumed to follow
the normal distributionQ ′ ∈ N (Q , σ 2). It is a plausible assumption that the consumer accepts the product only ifQ ′ exceeds
product price p. The acceptance probability can be shown to have the form
PA(Q , p|σ) = 12 − erf
(
p − Q√
2σ
)
where erf is the standard error function. As shown in Fig. A.7, the behavior of this acceptance probability is similar to that
of PA(Q , p) defined by Eq. (1). This behavior is recovered over a broad range of underlying assumptions (for example, when
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Fig. A.7. The resulting acceptance probability PA(Q , p|σ) for various values of σ when p = 1 (main plot) and when Q = 1 (inset). The thin dotted lines
show the acceptance probability course from Fig. 1 for α = 2, 4, 10.
additive errors are replaced with multiplicative ones). In this paper, we have chosen to study power-based acceptance
probabilities because of their simple form which allows us to obtain analytical results.
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